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The decisions taken during the crisis (and the circumstances that caused 
them) have reopened the debate on the role of central banks, their 
objectives, and the adequacy of monetary policy strategies.  
As is well known, the ECB has been granted exclusive jurisdiction to 
conduct the monetary policy of the euro area. However, rather than the 
view of the ECB as being tortured by its own statutes, the European 
Central Bank has exercised its crucial role as a lender of last resort to 
support the banking and public sectors, with the ultimate goal of 
safeguarding the stability of the euro area. 
In reviewing these issues in the light of the major changes, which have 
affected the economic and financial environment, we shall attempt a 
thorough analysis of the principles guiding European monetary authorities 
in their response to the financial emergency. 
The aim of this chapter is to prove that a similar evolution, not exclusive 
to national “central banking”, represents the natural outcome of the 
instrumental framework with which the ECB has been endowed, in order 
to carry out its tasks effectively. 
Key words: lender of last resort, monetary policy, central banking, debt 
crisis, bail out 
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1. Introductory notes 
Since its conception, a characteristic of the Eurozone has been the 
anomaly of the co-existence of many countries and a single monetary 
policy. In addition, monetarist orthodoxy, constantly reaffirmed in 
European treaties, has reinforced the neoliberal postulate “currency 
without a State and States without a currency” (Padoa Schioppa, 2004, p. 
5). The euro suffers from “lame” monetary sovereignty because of the lack 
of national and European “political” counterweights, and its premises 
sanction it as a failure in the diachronic sense. At the summit of the 
incomplete institutional framework of the European “fractal” stands a 
centralized monetary policy that is committed to an institution, the 
European Central Bank (ECB), which is independent of political decision-
makers and has its sole guiding star in the control of inflation.
2
 Creating a 
“currency without a state”, however, soon proved to be a utopian 
operation, and giving birth to a currency without an integrated banking 
system has not proved a wise choice either (Oddenino, 2015, p. 10). 
For all the institutions belonging to the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB), this structure has also separated currency management from any 
constraint related to national policies on public debt (Della Cananea, 2011; 
Merusi, 2014, p. 2 f.)
 3
. 
The reflections presented here are based on the claim that the structural 
malfunctioning of the “single currency” is a factor of imbalance (or 
rebalance, where possible) in relations within the market of the economic 
and monetary union.  
The specification of the functions and role assigned to the ECB in the 
treaties forms the content of this analysis, which, therefore, involves 
various issues, and tries to provide an appropriate line of argument 
focusing on the role of the “Lender of Last Resort” (LoLR).  
Besides the study of the classical notion of the lender of last resort, this 
line of study also concerns an examination of the extraordinary 
macroeconomic credit granted by the ECB in relation to, first of all, the 
liquidity crisis that has strangled the banking system, and, in rapid 
sequence, to the sovereign debt crisis in some member states. The 
virulence of the events in question did in effect require, as shown, the use 
of an instrument outside the contexts within which it was traditionally 
conceived and applied.  
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Here, we fear, there is an insufficiently explored link, which is combined 
with the need to focus research on the examination of a possible change in 
the institutional role of the ECB. Indeed, the central bank may be asked in 
the future to perform a far more extensive and important function than that 
hitherto covered, thus clearly affecting its own subjective organisation.  
2. The link (conflict?) between lex monetae and fiscal 
discipline in the light of the treaties 
Governing by rules finds its best embodiment in the “economic 
constitution”, namely monetary policy and fiscal policy, and specifically 
their mutual relationship. The initial weakness in European institutional 
design raised fears about the integrity of the monetary union, particularly 
with regard to the choice of separating monetary and economic policies 
while establishing a single currency. Government of monetary policy was 
assigned exclusively to the Union, pursuant to art. 3, (1), (C) TFEU; the 
government of economic policy was mainly attributed to the member 
states, with rather minimal EU (art. 5 TFEU) competence, which plays 
only a facilitating role in the coordination of the various national choices 
(Triulzi 2015, p. 7 ff.; Bucci, 2012; Mostacci, 2013, p. 492 ff.). The 
aforementioned separation contributes to uncertainty concerning the real 
effectiveness of economic policy coordination, which is impaired by the 
weakness of procedures of multilateral surveillance (art. 121 TFEU) on the 
one hand, and excessive deficit detection (art. 126 TFEU) on the other, 
and most of all by the penalties provided in the event of default (Peroni, 
2011, p. 977; Fabbrini, 2013, p. 102 f.; Cafaro, 2001, p. 29 ff.)
4
.  
The reason for this distinction stems from the idea that monetary policy, 
aiming to ensure price stability, should be entrusted to a technical body 
acting in a position of absolute independence from the political influence 
of the representative bodies (Predieri, 1996; Morosini, 2014, p. 29 ff.). 
However, because of their redistributive effects, economic and budget 
policy choices necessarily require a solid foundation in democratic 
legitimacy that only national political processes can provide. 
In the absence of a political union, the economic governance of the euro 
area was founded on fiscal rules and the “no-bailout clause” among 
member countries. This constitutes a fragile combination of market forces 
and rules of conduct, in the mistaken belief that, thanks to “governing by 
rules” Europe might live forever in a postmodern paradise; an era with no 
war, the “age of Venus”. Market forces drove economic convergence 
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among member countries, moving towards the definition and 
implementation of the necessary structural reforms at national level. The 
rules of conduct were used to ensure prudent fiscal policies. 
As pointed out in 1989 by the Delors Report on Economic and Monetary 
Union, the financial markets were considered unable to provide the right 
incentives to conduct prudent fiscal policies by themselves
5
. 
The decision not to have a “sovereign called upon to decide on the 
exception” did not however disarm the state of exception, and thus did not 
deprive public power of its necessary weapons. 
First and foremost, this is because the exchange rate and interest rate on 
public debt, which normally react to unsustainable fiscal policies, cannot 
exercise their moderating action in a monetary union, thus potentially 
causing a member state’s policy makers to achieve a budget deficit higher 
than what is financially tolerable for that country (Winkler, 2014, p. 3 f.). 
In a currency area such as the Eurozone, there is a high risk of moral 
hazard also on the part of national governments. Basically, it is widely 
held that market discipline is unable to induce responsible behaviours, 
despite the no-bailout clause and the prohibition of deficit monetization 
(arts. 125 and 123 TFEU respectively) enshrined in the treaties. Moreover, 
unsustainable fiscal policy in a country can produce spillover effects on 
other partners. 
3. The lender of last resort in the banking and sovereign 
debt crisis 
At least until the nineties, the role of lender of last resort was usually 
understood to fall to the national central banks as the last bulwark against 
the collapse of the domestic banking system. But in recent years, and 
specifically after the Mexican crisis, the idea has increasingly taken hold 
that an LoLR can be a good solution even when extended to bailing out 
states, especially when applied to an economic and financial area that has 
proved to be more fragile than expected, such as the economic and 
monetary union.  
Therefore, it is not surprising that this role has expanded to the states, 
because, as Bagehot argues, it is necessary to lend freely to anyone at risk 
of a liquidity crisis. Sovereign states are not at all different from other 
debtors when they lack immediate liquidity to face their debts. Moreover, 
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their possible liquidity crisis is even more dangerous because, given their 
size, it will inevitably turn into a systemic crisis that then puts the survival 
of the monetary union at risk.  
For some years, it was expected that national banking systems would 
harmoniously follow the path laid out by the single currency, breaking that 
centuries-old bond that united them to the nation states. The crisis has 
obviously broken the spell, showing first of all how risky it is to create a 
central bank without providing it with the powers typical of the lender of 
last resort, secondly, how ephemeral and reversible the integration process 
is and, finally, how close relations between states and banks are (De 
Grauwe, 2013, p. 520 ff.; Butther, Rahbari, 2012; Wilsher, 2014, p. 255 
f.).  
The term “lender of last resort” implies a degree of specificity that goes 
beyond what the function can legitimately define. In the confused 
political-institutional framework of the euro, central banks tried to face the 
crisis promptly and incisively, using a wide range of measures (Russo, 
2010, p. 492 ff.; ECB, 2010). The financial emergency required a review 
of the range of interventions designed to further neutralise the 
degenerative dynamics of the imbalances that had occurred in the 
economic systems
6
. As empirical evidence has shown, meeting the sudden 
increase in demand for liquidity prevented a descent into the messy 
process of deleveraging, and averted the collapse of illiquid, but solvent, 
banks and, more generally, strengthened confidence in the economy
7
.  
The spread of the risk of contagion through the banking system and 
member states in difficulty explains why, from summer 2007 to summer 
2008, containing the crisis was largely entrusted to the monetary policy 
authorities in the major currency areas (Federal Reserve; European Central 
Bank, Bank of England) and the supervisory authorities of the national 
banking systems. The first guaranteed the broad refinancing of distressed 
banks through loans of last resort (discount windows) and open market 
operations; the second, in agreement with national governments, 
proceeded at their discretion to bail out banks on the brink of bankruptcy, 
with the stated purpose of avoiding systemic crises (Solow, 1982). 
More generally speaking, the EU response developed along three lines of 
action: i) providing financial assistance to countries in crisis (Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal); ii) strengthening controls on the fiscal policies of 
member states (Spain and Italy); iii) stabilising the conditions of money 
and capital markets.  
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The first two lines of action mainly involved the European Commission 
and national governments at ECOFIN (Council of Finance Ministers) and 
the European Council; the third line called into question the powers of the 
European Central Bank (Tufano, 2012, p. 139). 
In such a situation, the demand for the implementation of extraordinary 
measures rose, in addition to the call for the adoption by monetary 
authorities of “quasi-fiscal” interventions suited to the objective of 
achieving cohesive order within highly pluralistic contexts. 
In particular, to prevent tensions in sovereign bond markets likely to 
jeopardize the smooth transmission of monetary policy because of their 
impact on the money market and bank lending, the ECB, while continuing 
to make use of fixed rate full allotment tenders for the refinancing of 
banks, also launched a programme of government bond purchasing 
(Securities Market Programme, “SMP”). 
Finally, the European Central Bank had to accept and play the role of 
lender of last resort, at first only de facto (through 3-year long-term 
refinancing operations), and then unofficially (with the announcement of 
the Outright Monetary Transactions plan). The outcome was a somewhat 
macroscopic expansion of its role that, going beyond the actions related to 
price stability, extends to the preservation of the European currency itself 
(Allemand, Martucci, 2012, p. 21).  
4. The “floating” nature of the LoLR in relation 
 to the concrete objectives of the treaty 
The novelty consisting in the replacement of national currencies by a 
single one is incorporated in the constitution of the European Central 
Bank, implying “first the uniqueness of the function of currency issue and 
management, and thus the transfer of a national sovereign function to the 
Federation” (Merusi, 1997, p. 7). Hence the key role granted to this 
institution within the Euro-system, as the latter carries out its functions 
primarily through the organs of the ECB (Papadia, Santini, 1998, p. 28; 
Santini, 2001, p. 12 ff.; Pellegrini, 2003, p. 214).  
The central bank bases its legitimacy on a carefully defined mandate that 
is integrated into a democratically established constitutional order by 
virtue of treaty provisions stating the independence of the issuing 
institution (Art. 130 TFEU), and that of the rules that identify the 
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"residual" target of the monetary policy. This attribute proved to be a point 
of undoubted strength for the overall “system” of crisis management. 
Indeed, support for the general policies of the Union is to be pursued only 
when the goal of price stability is “safeguarded” (Art. 127 TFEU)8, which 
is to be considered the true "mantra" of EU monetary policy 
9
. Monetary 
stability stands out as “an essential figure and a definite limit with respect 
to the ability of the ECB to profile or independently determine its goals. 
On the other hand, the primary right is always to set this objective within 
the overall objectives of the EU” (Oddenino 2015, p. 7)10. 
Therefore, entrusting the ECB with methods of implementing price 
stability would represent the way to combine the priority goal with the 
overall framework of its action. 
Indeed, it is not to be excluded a priori that, in order to act upon “an open 
market economy with free competition”, as stated in the final part of the 
previously mentioned para. 1 of art. 127, the drafters of the treaty – based 
on a criterion that ascribes primary emphasis to “cooperation” among 
member states – might have meant to confer upon the ECB broad and 
diverse competencies, which may certainly extend well beyond the mere 
coordination of monetary policies. 
This broader interpretation of article 127 would allow for a reduction of 
the importance of the primary objective of price stability to the benefit of 
supporting broader economic policies, and thus the legitimacy of further 
interventions that can be achieved in various ways and expanded in 
different directions
11
. 
Moreover, the disputed initiatives put in place by the ECB - while 
configuring prima facie a further exercise of its power of intervention 
recognised by the “Treaty on European Union” and the “Statute of the 
ESCB and of the Central Bank” – weigh on the sphere of competence 
originally assigned to the authority
12
. 
As stated, these are unconventional operations, all geared to controlling 
price stability, which materialised in the refinancing of the banking system 
and the purchase of debt securities of member states. 
As is well known, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is the 
process by which the European Central Bank aims to influence prices in 
the Eurozone, i.e. by acting on interest rates of reference. The ECB may 
intervene if the mechanism is hindered by disruptions in some market 
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segments, and the signal inherent in the ECB rate is not transmitted evenly 
across the whole Eurozone. In times of extraordinary financial market 
stress, the ESCB may resort to any means compatible with the treaty that 
are vital to achieving the objectives set. Therefore, it may decide to 
counter these tensions by using non-standard measures, which are part of 
the instruments for the implementation of monetary policy at its disposal, 
but which are, by definition, extraordinary and temporary tools.  
5. “States of exception” and interventions by the monetary 
authority as LoLR 
So, the role of the ECB in managing the crisis required many 
interventions, which can be considered as those of a lender of last resort 
coming into play in order to avoid bankruptcy; in the first place that of 
banks, and secondly that of states when faced with the risk of a fraying 
union (De Grauwe, 2011; Scipione, 2012, p. 67)
13
. 
From this perspective, the ECB’s addresses, documents, and procedures 
were gradually adapted to the growing emergency, with a transition from 
the range of the traditional instruments of monetary policy to the 
unprecedented use of non-standard operations impacting on financial 
markets. 
Monetary stability is indeed a primary interest, but it should be balanced 
against the equally important need not to exonerate those member states 
that do not respect budgetary discipline from their responsibility. 
However, it is observed that in the history of central banking this goal has 
coexisted with others. It coexists with others in the Treaty on European 
Union as well, so it is not unreasonable for the ECB to purchase debt 
securities issued by a sovereign state. 
Among the reasons for this choice is certainly the explicit will to prevent 
alterations deemed dangerous to the market economy, such as systemic 
crises. Therefore, if through a gradual, although not necessarily linear 
process, the European Central Bank has come to believe that it has a duty 
to intervene in support of this or that sovereign debt, such a choice should 
not be labelled as extra legem or even contra legem
14
 (Nielsen, 2012; 
Merler, Pisani-Ferry, 2012; Krauskopf, Steven, 2009, p. 1144 ff.; Perassi, 
2011; Malatesta, 2003; Zilioli, Selmayr, 2007). 
In fact – as described in economics literature – purchase interventions on 
the secondary market can affect the financing conditions of public 
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budgets, with a risk of interfering in fiscal policy. On the other hand, it is 
interesting to note that other measures that have directly affected the 
financing of the banking system have not provoked similar debate, 
although they have also led to a risk of interference, specifically with the 
prudential supervision authorities. Whenever the central bank injects 
liquidity through a transaction by which it purchases a banking or a public 
title for a specified time, it risks creating distortions in the prices of such 
assets; hence the need for procedures and safeguards. In the case of a loan 
to the banking system, it is necessary for the banks involved to be deemed 
healthy, and for the operations carried out to have adequate collateral. 
Likewise, in the specific case of both public or private securities 
purchases, it is crucial to consider the underlying status of the issuer 
healthy and the debt sustainable.  
The core of the reflections so far presented should therefore be addressed 
to the interpretation of the European Central Bank’s role in the context of 
European governance. Its reform resulted in albeit limited waivers of 
sovereignty by all member states, both in the field of the public budget and 
in the definition of structural policies.  
6. The ECB’s unconventional monetary policy  
and support to general economic policies 
In the wake of the peculiar contingency mentioned above, the public debt 
crisis in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy coincides with a 
profound change in the institutional design of the Eurozone, and goes far 
beyond the scope of monetary policy alone, where it originated. Thus, a 
power structure has begun to be established, able to redefine the spheres of 
influence of monetary authority and national governments in Europe.  
In this sense, we can say that the Greek case has clearly shown the 
disciplinary nature of monetary policy on public debt in the crisis context. 
This manifestation of the phenomenon quickly leaves room for a 
comprehensive institutional architecture improving and systematically 
repeating the set of operational practices put in place by the monetary 
authority. The new European institutional framework, based on the 
instruments of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMT), is the most refined form of the disciplining 
device through which the ECB and the European Commission can exert 
their influence on national economic policies in Europe (Winkler, 2014, p. 
6 f.).  
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Like ESM, the OMT is nothing but a refinement of the tools necessary to 
manage financial instabilities with increasing precision, so as to precisely 
calibrate the degree of pressure exerted on national economic policy 
makers, and systematically transfer instability within the disciplinary 
device of the conditional support provided by the lender of last resort.  
Indeed, the OMT instrument is bound, according to the principle of 
conditionality, to the larger design of monetary policy on public debt 
(Draghi, 2013a). For the reasons mentioned earlier, it is indisputable that 
the OMT programme blurs the separation between monetary policy and 
fiscal policy within the Eurozone: monetary policy is able to ensure 
stability only if the economic fundamentals and the institutional 
architecture are consistent with it
15
.  
Fears about the reversibility of the euro are related primarily to those on 
the sustainability of public debt and the competitiveness of member 
countries. Therefore, the activation of OMT by the European Central Bank 
and their continuation depends on precise commitments in terms of public 
finance and structural reforms within the framework of assistance 
programmes. Financing programmes using the common resources of the 
ESM is an incentive to continue to strengthen union governance, which is 
essential to permanently reduce the “European” component of spreads.  
From this perspective, the OMT are perfecting the ECB’s activity in the 
financial markets between 2010 and 2011 through SMP: the ESCB is 
committed to ensuring stability in the quotes of government bonds only if 
the country “hit” by financial instability accepts the lines of economic 
policy set out by the European authorities.  
Let it be clear that the strongest reasons in support of the ECB intervention 
can be found in its consistency with respect to other and further objectives 
than the ones of strict monetary policy; i.e., the underlying objectives of 
the union – economic, social, and territorial cohesion, and solidarity 
among member states (art. 3 TEU) – as reflected in the provision of 
support measures in case of crisis (arts 122 and 143 TFEU).  
Within the described framework of action, the relationship between 
economic policy and monetary policy is heavily tilted in favour of the 
latter, as the subject of the first involves a constant adjustment according 
to changes in the economic situation. This is not so much due to a formal 
aspect, considering that the instances for economic growth are also present 
in the treaties (as seen in relation to art. 127 TFEU), but more to a 
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substantial and identitarian one. Indeed, the ECB has come to identify 
itself with a very specific model, and based on this model it has exercised 
its discretion in identifying the graduation of the objectives it is committed 
to, considering at length its first and main objective, price stability, as 
potentially fully encompassing all others (Barbier, 2012, p. 212).  
These are the aspects that, more than others, provide useful tools to 
explain the role played by the ECB in respect of the disruption of basic 
paradigms that international financial markets nowadays hetero-impose on 
the different spheres of monetary sovereignty. Given that the monetary 
policy mandate by state sovereignties fades and eventually disappears, it is 
clear how this causes a tendency to absolutise the monetary imperatives, 
until the conclusion that the ground for discussion of monetary policies 
should always be the market, characterised by established, more than 
proven, self-regulatory virtues (Oddenino, 2015, p. 11).  
Are these considerations enough to ensure that the actions of the ECB are 
located in the flow of community legitimacy? At least from the point of 
view of institutional balance, there is no denying that there was a de facto 
change or evolution. The ECB has undeniably qualified as an (on-demand) 
political decision-maker and not merely a technocratic body, as the treaty 
describes it (Papadia, 2014, pp. 93 ff.; Tucker, 2014, p. 10). 
7. Operational discretion by the ECB and profiles  
of central banking 
In the crisis scenario, some operational forms of the ECB mark the 
requirement for acknowledging a role that is fully responsive to its nomen 
iuris. From the point of view of theoretical argumentation, it is not of 
secondary importance to stress how the measures taken by the ECB offer 
the example of an agent who – being forced by external shocks – engages 
in a redefinition of its mandate, which leads to deepening the integration 
process and, consequently, clashes with the attempts by some devices to 
restrain such an evolution. 
It is obvious that the role of the LoLR is definitely more effective when 
assigned to a supranational body (a characteristic that the FED does not 
possess), and as such the ECB plays a key role in this field, provided, 
however, reforms are made to both the structure of the monetary union 
(with important waivers of sovereignty by states) and the powers conferred 
upon the issuing central institute. 
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The internationalisation of financial transactions has blurred the lines of 
responsibility for a national LoLR. Even more important is the fact that 
today the actions of a central bank produce effects on foreign financial 
markets, in addition to potential effects on exchange rates. In situations of 
distress, such as those imposed by the financial crisis, these actions may 
result in the further destabilisation of markets. Therefore, LoLRs that are 
nowadays capable of providing liquidity at the global level are more 
necessary than ever.  
There are four potential roles that a supranational level LoLR may play in 
a context of illiquidity: (i) to prevent panic, simply by virtue of its 
existence; (ii) if panic is already present, to lend what is needed to avoid 
worsening the situation; (iii) to grant loans during a debt crisis, also 
defining reimbursement priorities, as happens in cases of bankruptcy on a 
national level; (iv) to grant loans during the collapse of a state’s public 
sector, to support it in the strengthening or regaining of its sovereignty - an 
unlikely mission for private markets (Sachs, 1999, p. 382). 
These components make it increasingly urgent to rethink the international, 
not only European, financial architecture. A possible solution could be 
found, as has happened with the national central banks since the end of the 
nineteenth century, in providing the ECB with the full functions of lender 
of last resort.  
Therefore, there is broad consensus on an interpretation of this role that 
entrusts the European Central Bank with two specific functions:  
(A) “Crisis lender”, which the ECB would be able to play because of 
its power to mobilise still very large resources  
(B) “Crisis manager”, that is to say a coordinator of relations between 
creditors and debtors, which does not necessarily require financial 
resources, but above all the ability to impose concrete 
commitments on both parties, and to verify compliance.  
 
To date, the use of the instrument seems to meet the expectations. The 
ECB seems to be the most suitable institution to carry out an analysis of 
the nature of crises in the Eurozone, which, in the national context, 
corresponds to the liquidity risk assessment of a bank
16
.  
In all honesty, this argument has not always been presented as 
thoroughgoing. In the face of a widespread financial crisis, it is not easy to 
conceive an automatic market mechanism that would make a lender of last 
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resort unnecessary. The first required procedure is to try and prevent 
contagion upstream, by supporting states where outbreaks of illiquidity are 
kindled. Then, such intervention as is aimed at those states cannot shrink 
to open market operations; it must be allowed to extend to forms of direct 
refinancing. This is all the more so as the money market moves away from 
an abstract, never reached, and unattainable perfection.  
One thing is certain: the transformation of the ECB into a lender of last 
resort for the European Monetary Union, in the full sense that the 
experience of Western countries and the literature on central banking have 
credited to it, will require a transformation of the international legal 
system: from a set of sovereign states governed by the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda, but basically devoid of any legal sanction, into a 
supranational system governed by rules whose breach entails specific 
consequences provided by law (Giannini, 2004; Howarth, Loedel, 2003; 
Haan, 2005; Harold, 2012).  
Moreover, the lender of last resort is a borderline instrument, between 
monetary policy and surveillance; in other words, it is addressed to the 
system as a whole and granted to the individual units that are part of it. 
The stability of the banking and financial industry is the original and 
permanent, though no longer the only, raison d’être of central banking.  
8. Conclusions 
Reporting several points of weakness in the legal framework of the 
European Monetary Union brings a further implication, this time regarding 
the opportunities that the financial and economic crisis unfolds (Darvas, 
Merler, 2013, p. 8). The course of action taken by the European Central 
Bank – although addressed to the restoration of monetary policy and, 
therefore, to market stabilisation for sovereign debt – cannot be considered 
in lieu of a real policy of public budget consolidation. For non-standard 
measures to yield expected results, the action of the ECB must be an 
integral part in a framework of broader reforms at European Community 
level
17
.  
But then, the strong “interventionism” that has characterised the activities 
of the ECB since the beginning of the crisis is a mere consequence of the 
political vacuum in the European Union and the Eurozone’s institutional 
and political failures
18
.  
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It is now quite clear that the euro crisis is not due solely to the lack of 
coordination of economic policies in member states, but is mainly the 
result of the absence of a decision-making centre where a European 
unitary fiscal policy can be defined and then applied uniformly in each 
member state.  
To allow the ECB to conduct an independent and effective monetary 
policy in a timely manner, it is necessary to achieve a euro architecture in 
which all players know their own part: governments, the central bank, and 
the European institutions. It goes without saying that greater and clearer 
assignment of responsibilities to the ECB should match a context of 
strengthened democratic legitimacy.  
Euro economic governance is nowadays characterised, on the one hand, by 
an excessive focus on balanced budgets, as imposed by “fiscal compact”, 
and on the other, by the search for an adequate conditionality, which, with 
varying degrees of intensity, accompanies the financial assistance 
provided by the Financial Stability Mechanism and the ECB itself.  
Shaping a new formula for the government of economy and currency at 
the European level is the factual premise for developing answers to be 
consistent with EU policy and interventions in support of the purposes 
mentioned above - namely, facing speculative turbulence on sovereign 
debt while pursuing, at the same time, strict fiscal policies.  
If any form of monetary union is to exist, it is essential, first and foremost, 
for it to evolve through a gradual transition into a real political union, and 
secondly, that there be a central bank capable of intervening during 
financial crises, either by means of an unlimited liquidity offering to calm 
down the markets or through the so-called liquidity preference (assuming a 
debt crisis cannot be resolved with the issuance of more debt).  
The structural limit of the institutional design of the Eurozone can be 
overcome by combining two types of interventions: (i) a centralised fiscal 
policy
19
, so as to re-tally the geographical boundaries of the fiscal and 
monetary authorities, and (ii) an implicit guarantee of government debt by 
the ECB, through the activity of a buyer of last resort of government debt 
securities, with no limitations (Panico, Purificato, 2012, p. 17). 
Only the transfer of fiscal policy from individual states to the European 
Union will probably solve the euro crisis. The prevailing argument is that 
the action of the ECB in the financial markets, through its large arsenal of 
monetary instruments, can only limit the negative effects of the crisis. On 
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the other hand, in the absence of an adequate political response on the 
future of the euro, it will never be able to permanently solve such a 
dramatic phenomenon
20
. 
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Notes 
                                                 
2 So, the link between state and currency, and likewise between fiscal and 
monetary policy (which is raised with extreme relevance) has deep roots that refer 
to the origins of the currency. Scholars had already pointed out the anomaly of the 
Eurosystem in the weak link between currency and State, to a degree never seen 
before (Goodhart, 1998, p. 407 ff.). A divorce between monetary and fiscal policy 
that could have absolutely unexpected implications, he wrote. Normally a currency 
is associated to a State. Rarely is a single currency associated with many States of 
significant size and with different fiscal policies, such as in the euro area.  
3 Della Cananea, 2011. The States’ legal systems were based on an assumption 
generally taken for granted in legal treatises: for all States, financial sovereignty 
equals monetary sovereignty. In a united Europe, both postulates have failed, 
although to varying degrees. As regards currency, what Hayek considered to be the 
main route, the establishment and control of competition between national 
currencies, was not followed. It was decided that public authorities would have 
exclusive competence, but transferring it up to Union level. The adoption of a 
single lex monetae in Europe set aside the differences between countries.  
4 Notwithstanding these limitations, even before 2008 the Eurozone had gradually 
qualified as a legally distinct area within the Union, an incubator for those 
innovations that then became necessary to react to the crisis. (See: Dickmann, 
2012; Overbeek, 2012, pp. 30 ff., p 38 ff.; Ruffert, 2011, p. 1777 ff.; Chiti, 2012, p. 
783 ff.; Chaltiel, 2012, p. 293 f.; Athanassiou, 2011, p. 558 ff.) 
5 Indeed, it was considered in the 1989 Delors Report that regarding public 
 
Chapter Ten 
 
228 
                                                                                                     
finance, “the constraints imposed by market forces might either be too slow and 
weak or too sudden and disruptive”. As highlighted in the report, what is lacking in 
EU economic policy, unlike monetary policy, is the 'institutional solution': its 
eminently regulatory character, although involving European institutions in the 
mechanisms of control and correction, entrusts them with very few powers of 
government. To paraphrase a renowned scholar (Carreau, 1971, p. 592) it can be 
assumed that once again the EC Treaty seems to be written for a “happy future”, 
“because the lack of elasticity of such a system that would be necessary to adapt to 
changed circumstances is clear.” (Cafaro, 2001, p. 343).  
6 As explained by De Grauwe, 2012: 
 
[...] if financial stability is to be maintained, because the sovereign and the 
banks hold each other in a deadly embrace. When the banking system 
collapses, this threatens the solvency of the sovereign. When the sovereign 
defaults on its debt, it pulls the banks into default. This means that the 
banking sector cannot be stabilized if the sovereign is unstable. A central 
bank that wishes to stabilize the banking sector is condemned to also 
stabilize the government bond market. Failure to do so leads to a banking 
crisis, forcing the central bank to provide huge amounts of liquidity to 
banks that it refuses to provide to the sovereign.  
 
7 To safeguard the stability of the system, there are proposals to replace the 
traditional Lender of Last Resort with a Liquidity Provider of Last Resort; a sort of 
“government” lender that would be ready to purchase Securities in the markets 
when the panic materialises rather than inject liquidity into the banks.  
8 Consistently with the aim of maintaining price stability and controlling inflation 
(implemented through monitoring of the monetary base and/or setting short-term 
interest rates), the European Central Bank, pursuant to art. 127, para. 1 of the 
TFEU, is competent “to support the general economic policies in the Union with a 
view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union”. Namely 
the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and 
price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full 
employment and favoring an efficient allocation of resources and respecting the 
principles of art. 119, (3), TFEU: “stable prices, sound public finances and 
monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments”. 
9 It should be borne in mind that Art. 2 of the ECB Statute allows the Central Bank 
to act in support of the EU general economic policies, only subject to the 
maintenance of price stability.  
10 Although a basic precondition for meeting the general objectives of the Union, 
the achievement of monetary stability is a device “not unique in its strategic 
components, and whose definition is left to the responsibility of the organ deputed 
to its pursuit, and to this end, independent” (Oddenino 2015, p. 7). With reference 
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to these profiles, see Bini Smaghi, Gross, 2000; Eijffinger, De Haan, 2000; De 
Grauwe, 2013a, p. 196. 
11 In favour of a more flexible interpretation of the same principle of monetary 
stability see (De Grauwe, 2006, p. 158 ff.; and Domingo Solans, 1999). 
12 See, among others, Capriglione, 1999, p. 761 ff., who, with regard to the 
"supervisory policy" (p. 764), stresses that the original Community legislation 
limited ECB intervention to an advisory capacity, while specifying that such 
activity might “affect the exercise of supervision in the Member States”.  
13 In this sense, see De Grauwe, 2011a, p. 2, who believes that “[t]he only 
institution in the Eurozone that can perform this role is the European Central Bank. 
Up until recently, the ECB has performed this role either directly by buying 
government bonds, or indirectly by accepting government bonds as collateral in its 
liquidity provision to the banking system”. 
14 Pinelli, 2012, 3:  
 
The ECB is in fact an even unitary institution when considering the control 
of monetary policy, and is structurally supranational, in whose regard the 
inter-state coordination cannot serve as a political counterweight. By 
contrast, the Treaty of Lisbon institutionalised the European Council to the 
point that it became something more than a simple counterweight to the 
strengthened network between supranational institutions (Parliament and 
Commission). 
 
15 According to the European judges (Court of Justice, Case C-62/14), the line 
between measures of monetary policy and economic policy cannot be traced 
clearly, as certainly the former have an impact on economic policy and are part of 
it. Although elusive, the distinction between the two is of considerable importance 
as it is relevant to the division of responsibilities (both horizontal between 
institutions and vertically between States and the European Union) as provided for 
by the Treaties (para 129).  
On this, the Court of Justice had already ruled in the Pringle case (Court of Justice, 
case C-370/12). On that occasion it had stated that “an economic policy measure 
cannot be treated as equivalent to a monetary policy measure for the sole reason 
that it may have a direct effect on the stability of the euro” (para 56) and that “the 
grant of financial assistance to a Member State however clearly does not fall 
within monetary policy.” (para 57).  
16 Cf. Praet, 2012, who argues that the ECB has been acting as   
 
lender of last resort for the sovereigns of the euro system since it started its 
outright purchases of euro area periphery sovereign debt under the 
securities market program (SMP) in May 2010. The scale of its 
interventions as LoLR for sovereigns has grown steadily since then and its 
range of instruments has expanded. We interpret the longer term 
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refinancing operations (LTROs) of December 2011 and February 2012 as 
being as much about acting, indirectly, as LoLR for the Spanish and Italian 
sovereigns by facilitating the purchase of their debt by domestic banks in 
the primary issue market as about dealing with a liquidity crunch for Euro 
area banks.  
 
Accordingly, see also the arguments put forward by Buiter, Rahbari, 2012, p. 1 ff.; 
Trichet, 2010.  
17 The incompleteness of European integration has effectively prevented the 
transmission of monetary policy among the member States, thus endangering the 
functional independence of the ECB. From this perspective, the European 
sovereign debt crisis has shown that there is no alternative to the harmonisation of 
European fiscal policies and the reform of EU policies. On the destabilising 
capacity due to the absence of a common fiscal policy in a common currency area, 
see Fatás, Mihov, 2010, p. 287 ff. See also the remarks of Gualandri, 2008, p. 3 ff.; 
Hellwig, 2011, n. 11, June; as well as the intervention of Draghi, 2008. In 
economics scholarship it is widely accepted that the fiscal crisis and the banking 
crisis are closely linked: coordination and rules on budgetary discipline must be 
added with convincing political support for the European supervision and 
regulation of banks. 
18 This is quite a substantial difference compared with the American system, where 
the FED faces the Congress and, if necessary, the Treasury Department as its 
political counterparts, both of which are able to work at federal level, and are 
highly expansive when necessary.  
19 For an overall appraisal of the new instruments of European economic 
governance, see Rossolillo, 2014, p. 325 ff.; S. Rossi, 2014, p. 11 f.; European 
Council, 2012; Boitani, 2012, p. 99 ff.; Bordignon, 2012, p. 139 ff.; Marzinotto, 
Sapir, Wolff, 2011; Manasse, 2007. 
20 According to Draghi, 2012, although a full federation between European States 
is not indispensable, in the long term it will be necessary to proceed gradually and 
achieve four pillars: financial union, fiscal union, economic union, and political 
union.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
